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Abstract
This paper develops an economic theory of empire building. This theory addresses the
choice among three strategies that empire builders historically have used. We call these
strategies Uncoerced Annexation, Coerced Annexation, and Attempted Conquest. The theory
yields hypotheses that relate the choice among these strategies to such factors as the economic
gains from imperial expansion, the relative eﬀectiveness of imperial armies, the costs of
projecting imperial military power, and liquidity constraints on ￿nancing imperial armies.
This theory also yields hypotheses about the scope of imperial ambitions. The paper uses
examples from the history of the Roman, Mongol, Ottoman, and Nazi German empires to
illustrate the applicability of the theory.
JEL classi￿cation numbers: D74, F02, N40
Keywords: Annexation, Conquest, Empire BuildingThis paper develops an economic theory of empire building. This theory addresses both
the choice among strategies that can be used to expand an empire as well as the scope
of imperial ambitions. The paper uses examples from the history of the Roman, Mongol,
Ottoman, and Nazi German empires to illustrate the applicability of the theory.
To focus the analysis, we consider the following story: The Romans are thinking about
expanding their empire by incorporating a country now ruled by Barbarians. Historical ac-
counts suggest that the Romans, like other empire builders, can choose among three diﬀerent
strategies.
In an Uncoerced Annexation the Romans compensate the Barbarians suﬃciently to
induce the Barbarians to agree to the annexation of their country by Rome. This strategy
requires that incorporating the country into the Roman empire would yield either economic
or military advantages and that the Romans share these gains with the Barbarians. The
attraction of this strategy to the Romans is that it avoids the expense of sending Legions
either to threaten or to attempt to conquer the Barbarians.
In a Coerced Annexation the Romans induce the Barbarians to agree to the annexation
of their country under the threat that the Romans will attack and try to conquer the country.
This strategy requires the Romans to send Legions of suﬃcient strength to the borders of
the Barbarian country that the Barbarians decide to capitulate rather than to resist the
Romans. The attraction of this strategy to the Romans is that it avoids having to share the
gains from annexation with the Barbarians.
In an Attempted Conquest the Romans attack the Barbarian country. This strategy
is cheaper than the strategy of Coerced Annexation. It requires sending Legions to the
Barbarian country, but fewer Legions that would be necessary to induce the Barbarians to
capitulate. But, this strategy is risky in that an Attempted Conquest can fail.
Our theory assumes that the Romans will employ any one of these strategies only if its
expected value to the Romans is both positive and at least as large as the expected value to
1the Romans of any other strategy. If none of these strategies have a positive expected value,
then the Romans will not attempt to incorporate the Barbarian country into the Roman
empire.1
1. Uncoerced Annexation
Let ω denote the present value of the expected stream of rents that the Barbarians
receive as rulers of the country, and let Ω denote the expected gross present value to the
Romans of annexing the country, where Ω = k ω,k ≥ 0. If k is larger than one,
then the Romans expect that they can pro￿tably compensate the Barbarians for agreeing to
annexation by oﬀering the Barbarians a stream of payments whose present value is at least
as large as ω.2
The factor k could be larger than one for a variety of reasons. One set of possibilities is
directly economic. For example, Roman rule could bring more eﬃcient public administration.
It is also possible that as a part of the Roman empire or as an ally of Rome the country
would have expanded trading opportunities.
Another set of possibilities is military and, hence, indirectly economic. For example,
by annexing the Barbarian country the Romans could gain either access to resources or
geopolitical advantages that would make it easier either to defend the existing borders of
their empire or to incorporate other desirable countries into their empire.
1A related paper by Ronald Findlay (1996) develops an economic analysis of the size of empires. Findlay￿s
model abstracts from the distinction between annexation and conquest, which is the main concern of the
present paper. Also, Findlay treats territorial expansion as a continuous choice variable, rather than modeling
the incorporation of discrete countries together with their populations into an empire, as in the present paper.
2The formal arrangements of an Uncoerced Annexation can range from direct Roman rule to an alliance
with Rome under Roman leadership. If, as is likely, the Romans and the Barbarians doubt the credibility
of each other￿s commitments, then each party can ensure the performance of the other party by making its
own obligations, as well as the prerogatives of the other party, conditional on the other party meeting its
obligations. As we will see, Roman history reveals that in fact conditionality was an important component
of Uncoerced Annexation.
2Let RA denote the expected value to the Romans of a strategy of Uncoerced Annexation.
Allowing for the possibility that k is larger than one, we have
(1) RA =m a x {Ra, 0}, where Ra ≤ (k − 1)ω.
In equation (1), Ra equals the diﬀerence between the expected gross present value to the
Romans of annexing the country and the present value of the compensation that the Romans
pay to the former Barbarian rulers.
2. Coerced Annexation or Attempted Conquest
Let Q denote the probability, as perceived by both the Romans and the Barbarians, that,
if the Romans send Legions to the Barbarian country, then they will successfully incorporate
the Barbarian country into the Roman empire. Let g denote the size of the Legions that the
Romans send to the country, and let h denote the amount of resources that the Barbarians
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Equation (2), together with the parameter θ, maps g and h into the perceived
probability, Q. The value of θ depends on anticipations or perceptions of the factors that
determine the eﬀectiveness of Roman Legions against Barbarian defenses. These factors can
include the eﬀectiveness of the military tactics that the adversaries employ, the quality of
their training, equipment, and leadership, and the amounts of popular support and support
from third parties that they enjoy.
According to equation (2) Q is positive if and only if g is positive. Also, if g is
positive, then Q is an increasing function of g and a decreasing function of h. If g is
positive and if h equals zero, then Q equals one.
3To analyze Roman strategy, we must analyze ￿rst how the Barbarians respond to a
Roman threat. Let BC denote the expected value to the Barbarians of resisting a Roman
attempt to conquer their country. If the Romans send Legions to their country, then the
Barbarians choose h to maximize BC, where
(3) BC =( 1 − Q) ω − h.
Assume that in choosing h the Barbarians take g as given. This assumption implies
that a Roman decision to allocate resources to sending Legions to the country is irreversible.
In eﬀect, this model assumes that the Romans are a Stackelberg leader.3
From equations (2) and (3) the solution to the Barbarians￿ choice problem is
(4) h =m a x {
q
θgω − θg, 0}.
Equation (4) implies that the Barbarians choose a positive value of h if and only if g
is positive but smaller than ω/θ.4 Thus, a strategy of Coerced Annexation requires g
to be at least as large as ω/θ, which is the minimum positive value of g that would
induce the Barbarians to choose h equal to zero and to capitulate. Alternatively, a strategy
of Attempted Conquest requires a positive, but smaller, value of g, in which case the
Barbarians resist the Romans by choosing a positive value of h.
Let RC denote the expected value to the Romans of sending Legions to the Barbarian
country. Assume for now that the cost of sending Legions of size g is g. Accordingly, if
3Several recent models of the allocation of resources to con￿ict have explored the implications of Stack-
elberg leadership. For example, Dmitriy Gershenson (2002) assumes that a group that wants to change the
distribution of economic rents is a Stackelberg leader. His model allows the possibility, which is analogous to
coerced annexation, that the leader can induce the follower to acquiesce in the desired change. In contrast,
Herschel Grossman and Minseong Kim (1995) associate Stackelberg leadership with the defense of claims
to property. Their model allows the possibility that the leader can deter the follower from challenging the
status quo.
4This analysis abstracts from the possibility that the Romans impose additional penalties on Barbarians
who resist the Romans unsuccessfully rather than capitulate.
4the Romans send Legions to the country, then they choose g to maximize RC, where
(5) RC = Q Ω − g.
In choosing g the Romans take into account both the direct eﬀect of g on Q, as given
by equation (2), as well as the indirect eﬀect on g on Q through the eﬀect of g on h,
as given by equation (4).5
From equations (2), (4), and (5), the solution to the Romans￿ choice problem is
(6) g =m i n {k
2θω/4, ω/θ}.
Because k2θω/4i s s m a l l e r t h a nω/θ only if the product of θ and k is smaller than
two, equation (6) implies that, if the Romans send Legions to the country, then they choose
g large enough to induce the Barbarians to capitulate if and only if the product of θ and
k is at least as large as two. If θk is smaller than two, then the Romans choose a smaller
value of g the smaller is k, θ, or ω.
Substituting equations (4) and (6) into equation (2), we ￿nd that, if the Romans send
Legions to the country, then in equilibrium the probability that they will successfully incor-
porate the country into the Roman empire is
(7) Q =m i n {θk/2, 1}.
Equation (7) implies that, if and only if the product of θ and k is as large as two, in which
case the Barbarians capitulate, then Q equals one. But, if θk is smaller than two, in which
case the Barbarians resist, then Q is smaller the smaller is θk. Equation (7) also implies
that, although Q depends on k, which is the ratio of Ω to ω,Qdoes not depend on
the absolute value of ω, because in equilibrium both g and h are proportionate to ω.
5Another consideration, which would give the Romans an incentive to choose g to be positive but smaller
than ω/θ, could be that an Attempted Conquest, by demonstrating the eﬀectiveness of Roman Legions,
would increase the value of θ in future confrontations with Barbarians. The present analysis abstracts from
this consideration.
5Substituting equations (6) and (7) into equation (5), the expected value to the Romans






(θk − 1)ω/θ for θk ≥ 2.
Equation (8) says that RC is larger the larger are θ,kand ω.
3. Roman Strategy
From equations (1) and (8) we can infer the conditions under which the Romans will use
each of the three possible strategies. Figure 1 illustrates these results.
￿ Uncoerced Annexation: The Romans agree to compensate the Barbarians suﬃ-
ciently to induce the Barbarians to agree to the annexation of their country by the Roman
empire only if 0 <R A ≥ RC. Assuming, for simplicity, that Ra equals (k−1)ω, equations
(1) and (8) imply that these conditions are satis￿ed if and only if
(9)
either 1 <k<2a n dθ ≤ 4(k − 1)/k2
or k ≥ 2a n d θ ≤ 1.
.
[See Appendix A for the derivation of condition (9).] As we see in Figure 1, condition (9)
obtains only if k is larger than one and θ is smaller than one. This analysis implies
that the Romans use a strategy of Uncoerced Annexation only if annexing the country
would yield large economic or military bene￿ts to the Romans and only if the Romans, and
the Barbarians, anticipate that Roman Legions are not too eﬀective against the Barbarian
defenses.6
6The assumption that Ra equals (k−1)ω implies that the Romans agree to make a stream of payments
with present value ω to the Barbarian rulers of the country and that, consequently, the Romans get all of
the expected net gain from incorporating the country into the Roman Empire. If the Romans do not get all
of the expected net gain, then, to satisfy the condition 0 <R A ≥ RC, either k must be larger or θ must
be smaller. An interesting extension would be to model the bargaining game between the Romans and the
Barbarians.

















k: gain from imperial expansion
θ:r e l a t i v e e ﬀectiveness of imperial armies￿ Coerced Annexation: The Romans send Legions of suﬃcient size to induce the
Barbarians to capitulate only if θk ≥ 2a n d0 <R C ≥ RA. Assuming that Ra equals
(k − 1)ω, equations (1) and (8) imply that these conditions are satis￿ed if and only if
(10) θ ≥ max{1, 2/k}
As we see in Figure 1, condition (10) obtains if k is larger than two and θ is larger than
one. If k is not larger than two, θ must be larger the smaller is k. This analysis implies
that, if the Romans expect that the country will have substantial economic or military value
as part of their empire, and if the Romans, and the Barbarians, anticipate that Roman
Legions are highly eﬀective against the Barbarian defenses, then the Romans use a strategy
of Coerced Annexation.
￿ Attempted Conquest: The Romans attack and try to conquer the country only if
θk ≤ 2a n d0 <R C ≥ RA. Assuming that Ra equals (k − 1)ω, equations (1)a n d( 8 )
imply that these conditions are satis￿ed if and only if
(11)m a x {4(k − 1)/k
2, 0} < θ ≤ 2/k.
As we see in Figure 1, condition (11) obtains only if neither θ nor k are too large.
This analysis implies that the Romans attack and try to conquer a country only if the
Romans, and the Barbarians, anticipate that Roman Legions are not too eﬀective against
the Barbarian defenses and only if the Romans do not expect that annexing the country
would yield economic or military advantages that are too large. To understand this result,
observe that equation (6) implies that, with small values of θ and k, although the Romans
attack and try to conquer the country, they do not allocate as large an amount of resources
to this eﬀort as an alternative strategy of Coerced Annexation would require.
Conditions (9), (10), and (11) show how the Romans￿ choice of strategy depends on the
parameters, θ and k. These conditions also reveal that the Romans￿ choice of strategy
does not depend on the absolute value of ω, again because in equilibrium both g and h
are proportionate to ω.
74. The Scope of Imperial Ambitions
In the preceding section, either condition (9), or condition (10), or condition (11)w a s
satis￿ed. Thus, this analysis implied that the Romans want to incorporate every Barbarian
country into the Roman empire. This implication is counter factual.
In order to bound the scope of imperial ambitions, assume that the cost to the Romans





0 for g =0
f + g for g>0.
The parameter f in equation (12) represents a ￿xed cost of sending Legions.
The preceding analysis implicitly assumed that f equals zero. Because the value of
f does not aﬀect the marginal cost of sending Legions to the Barbarian country, equations
(6) and (7) obtain whether or not f is positive. But, if f is positive, then equation (8)
generalizes to





θk2ω/4 − f for θk<2
(θk − 1)ω/θ − f for θk ≥ 2.
Equation (13) implies that RC is not positive if and only if
(14)
either θk<2a n df/ω ≥ θk2/4
or θk ≥ 2a n df/ω ≥ (θk − 1)/θ.
.
Condition (14) is satis￿ed for a combination of a suﬃciently large value of the ratio, f/ω,
and suﬃciently small values of the parameters, k and θ. Thus, condition (14) implies that,
if the ￿xed cost of sending Legions is large relative to the wealth of the Barbarian country
and if the Romans, and the Barbarians, anticipate that Roman Legions are not too eﬀective
against the Barbarian defenses, then the Romans will expect neither Coerced Annexation
nor Attempted Conquest to be pro￿table.
8Recall that equation (1) implies that RA is not positive if k is not larger than one.
Thus, if both k is not larger than one and condition (14) obtains, then neither RA nor RC
is positive. Countries for which both k is not larger than one and condition (14) obtains
are beyond the scope of Roman imperial ambitions. The theory implies that the Romans
are not interested in incorporating such countries into the Roman empire either through
Uncoerced Annexation, Coerced Annexation, or Attempted Conquest.
Even if RA and RC are positive, a positive value of f makes RC smaller and, hence,
would imply that RA is larger than RC for a larger range of values of k and θ. In other
words, a ￿xed cost of sending Legions makes Coerced Annexation and Attempted Conquest
less pro￿table and makes Uncoerced Annexation relatively more attractive. [See Appendix
B for a derivation of the conditions for 0 <R A ≥ RC with f>0.]
5. Liquidity Constraints
The preceding discussion has assumed implicitly that the Romans can mobilize suﬃcient
resources to send to the Barbarian country Legions with a size that equals the value of g
given by equation (6). This assumption abstracts from the possibility that the Romans face
a binding liquidity constraint on their ability to mobilize resources.
To relax this abstraction, let g denote the maximum amount of resources that the
Romans can mobilize to send Legions to the Barbarian country. If condition (10) obtains,
but g is smaller than ω/θ, which is the value of g that a strategy of Coerced Annexation
requires, then g is a binding liquidity constraint. This constraint would prevent the Romans
from using a strategy of Coerced Annexation that they otherwise would prefer.7
If a binding liquidity constraint precludes a strategy of Coerced Annexation, then the
Romans instead would use either a strategy of Attempted Conquest or a strategy of Unco-
7A binding liquidity constraint also could cause the Romans to use a strategy of Uncoerced Annexation
instead of a strategy of Attempted Conquest that they otherwise would prefer. This situation could occur
only if condition (11) obtains, with k larger than one, and, from equation (6), g is much smaller than
k2ωθ/4.
9erced Annexation. The Romans would use a strategy of Attempted Conquest, instead of a
strategy of Coerced Annexation, only if g is large enough, and k is small enough, that the
value of RC associated with g equal to g i se q u a lt oo rl a r g e rt h a n RA. Alternatively,
the Romans would use a strategy of Uncoerced Annexation, instead of a strategy of Coerced
Annexation, only if g is small enough, and k is large enough, that the value of RC
associated with g equal to g i se q u a lt oo rs m a l l e rt h a n RA.8
6. The Theory Applied to Roman History
From the ￿fth century BCE until the early part of the third century BCE, the incipient
Roman empire was often engaged in bloody con￿icts with its neighbors, both Latin and
Etruscan. Our theory, together with facts, suggests reasons for why in this period the
Romans used a strategy of Attempted Conquest. First, because civilization at this early date
probably was not much more advanced in Rome than in the Latin and Etruscan states, the
value of k associated with incorporating these states into the Roman empire was probably
not much larger than one. This fact precluded a strategy of Uncoerced Annexation. Second,
the incipient Roman empire probably faced binding liquidity constraints on its ability to
￿nance its Legions. In those days the Legions were composed mainly of conscripts and other
part-time soldiers, whose mobilization was ad hoc. This fact precluded a strategy of Coerced
Annexation. In addition, the Romans and their adversaries presumably learned only from
experience about the high eﬀectiveness of Roman Legions. This observation suggests that
Coerced Annexation initially would not have been a feasible strategy even in the absence of
binding liquidity constraints.
During the third century BCE the Romans incorporated the remaining states in the
Latin League and Etruria into the Roman empire, and during the second century BCE the
Romans added most of the Greek states to their empire. In this period, in contrast to earlier
8Substituting equations (2) and (4) into equation (5), and replacing g with g, we ￿nd that the value
of RC associated with g equal to g is k
√
θgω − g.
10times, the Romans used mainly a strategy of Coerced Annexation, as many of the states of
Italy and Greece capitulated without the Roman Legions attacking.9 As Edward Luttwak
(1976, page 2) tells us,
Forces visibly ready to ￿ght but held back from battle could serve...to control
lands and peoples by intimidation ￿ideally to the point where... eﬀective domi-
nation could be achieved without any use of force at all... indeed [the Romans]
conquered the entire Hellenistic world with few battles and much coercive diplo-
macy.
This change in the Romans￿ predominant strategy suggests that by the third century BCE
not only had experience demonstrated the high relative eﬀectiveness of Roman Legions, but
also that the Romans no longer faced binding liquidity constraints. The fact that by the
third century BCE the Legions comprised a standing army of professional soldiers, whom the
Roman state fed, clothed, and equipped, is consistent with a relaxing of liquidity constraints.
It is noteworthy that at about the same time that the Roman empire was consolidating
its control of Italy and expanding into Greece the Romans and the Carthaginians were
alternately attempting to conquer parts of each other￿s empires. Historical accounts of the
Punic Wars suggest that neither Rome nor Carthage enjoyed a large enough value of θ to
warrant a strategy of Coerced Annexation with respect to the other. Also, it seems unlikely
that incorporation of any part of either one of the empires into the other one would have
involved a large enough value of k to warrant a strategy of Uncoerced Annexation. Hence,
as the theory implies, both Rome and Carthage chose the strategy of Attempted Conquest.
In later years, as the Roman empire expanded into central and northern Europe, Asia
Minor, and the Middle East, the Romans￿ predominant strategy changed again. Now they
9The Epirians, whom Pyrrhus led to Pyrrhic victory, and the Macedonians were exceptions. The Romans
eventually conquered both of these states, but it seems that in confronting the Epirians and the Macedonians
the Romans did not have a large enough value of θ to use the strategy of Coerced Annexation.
11used mainly the strategy of Uncoerced Annexation. Historians refer to the small countries
that the Romans peacefully incorporated into their empire as ￿client states￿. Examples
include Judea, the countries of Germanic peoples like the Chauci, Cherusi, Quadi, and
Marcomanni, and various countries in Asia Minor. Our theory also suggests an explanation
for this change in strategy.
In attempting to push out the northern and eastern frontiers of the empire the Romans
encountered both relatively small values of θ and relatively large values of k. On these fron-
tiers the Roman Legions were not highly eﬀective against Barbarian defenses, as evidenced
by the mixed success of the Legions in their campaigns against the Germanic tribes, the
Dacians, and Parthians. But, annexing the client states yielded large military advantages to
the Romans. Both Luttwak and Erich Gruen (1984) stress that these military advantages
included enhanced ability both to defend the existing borders of their empire and to incorpo-
rate other desirable countries into their empire. As Luttwak (pages 19-20, 26, 27) describes
these advantages,
Since clients would take care to prevent attacks against provincial territory, their
obedience lessened the need to provide local security at the periphery of the em-
pire against low-intensity threats...Against high-intensity threats, such as inva-
sions on a provincial or even a regional scale, client states and client tribes could
contribute both their own interposed forces and their capacity to absorb the
threat ￿ in other words, they could provide geographic depth...Another obvious
contribution of client states and client tribes to Roman security was the supply
of local forces to augment Roman armies on campaign. Naturally, these troops
would fall into the Roman category of auxilia, i.e., cavalry and light infantry,
rather than legionary forces of heavy infantry...Auxiliary troops contributed by
clients had played an important role in the campaigns of the republic, not least
because they could provide military specialties missing from the regular Roman
12arsenal, such as archers, and especially mounted archers...The complementarity
between auxilia and legionary forces was an important feature of the Roman
military establishment; moreover, the forces maintained by the client states were
substantial.
Also, many of these client states had relatively primitive economies, and incorporating these
countries into the Roman empire resulted in large economic gains. With a small value of
θ and a large value of k, our theory implies that the Romans would chose a strategy of
Uncoerced Annexation.
How did the Romans compensate the rulers of their client states to induce them to agree
to being annexed into the Roman empire? As Luttwak (pages 32, 37) tells us, conditionality
was important.
Loyal and eﬃcient client rulers were rewarded by personal honors, ordinarily re-
ceiving Roman citizenship (which Augustus￿s highly restrictive citizenship policy
made an important privilege)...More tangible rewards were also given, primarily
territorial. That model client, Polemo I, king of Pontus, received Lesser Armenia
from Anthony, and when Augustus detached that territory from Pontus, Polemo
received instead the important (but, as it turned out, ungovernable) Bosporan
state. Similarly, when Herod - a very eﬃcient client ruler indeed - was still
in Augustus￿s good graces, he was granted in 24-23 B.C. part of the plateau
country of Ituraea (Golan-Hauran), at the expense of another client, Zenodorus,
who had failed to control the nomadic raiding of his subjects...The major active
instrument of client management among the primitive peoples of continental Eu-
rope was a systematic policy of subsidization...By channeling money and favors
through chosen client chiefs, the Romans helped the latter gain power over their
subjects, while the Romans gained power over them...Speaking of the once formi-
dable Marcomanni and Quadi, Tacitus describes both as ruled by client rulers
13maintained in power ￿ and controlled ￿ by a combination of occasional armed
assistance and ￿nancial support.
Luttwak (page 37) also suggests that to enforce deals with client states after they were
annexed the Romans supplemented Uncoerced Annexation with elements of Coerced An-
nexation.
The control mechanism was complex. It was necessary to manipulate the tribes
through their chiefs, while controlling the chiefs by means of personal threats
and personal inducements; always there was the latent threat of force against
the tribe as a whole.
Dacia, a relatively rich country, was an exception to the use of a strategy of Uncoerced
Annexation. But, the case of Dacia also accords with our theory. According to Peter Wilcox
a n dG .A .E m b l e t o n( 1987, page 25),
Dacian culture at this time was far in advance of that of their fellow European
barbarians. It was, in all recognizable aspects, an embryo civilization...Trade was
well organized and encouraged; silver and gold work, pottery, iron implements
and weapons, of extremely high quality, were produced for home consumption
and export to the sophisticated Roman world in the south.
Because Dacia already was economically advanced, the economic gains associated with
adding Dacia to the Roman empire apparently were not large enough to allow the Ro-
mans pro￿tably to compensate the Dacians for agreeing to annexation. Instead, just as our
theory implies, with neither θ nor k being large the Romans attempted to conquer Dacia,
and eventually were successful. Note that in the case of Dacia k was not large because
Dacia was already a rich country.10
10Another exception was Judea, where a strategy of Uncoerced Annexation, supplemented by elements of
Coerced Annexation, worked well until the Jewish revolt (66-70CE) forced the Romans to shift to a strategy
of Attempted Conquest, which, as in Dacia, was eventually successful.
14Our analysis of the scope of imperial ambitions also seems to be consistent with Roman
history. Luttwak (page 96) attributes the Roman decision not to incorporate Scotland into
the Roman empire to the Scotland￿s being ￿inherently diﬃcult to settle, urbanize, and
Romanize￿. In addition, because of its location, annexation of Scotland was not attractive
for geopolitical reasons. In the terms of our theory, Scotland apparently diﬀered from the
client states of central and northern Europe, Asia Minor, and the Middle East in that, in
addition to θ being too small to make a strategy of either Coerced Annexation or Attempted
Conquest attractive, k was too small to warrant a strategy of Uncoerced Annexation. Note
that in the case of Scotland k was small because Scotland was hopelessly poor.
7. The Theory Applied to the History of The Mongol and Ottoman Empires
This analysis does not only oﬀer insights into the building of the Roman empire. In
his discussion of the expansion of the Mongol empire, E.L. Jones (1998, pages 108-115)
suggests that the Mongols used mainly a strategy of Attempted Conquest, which was usually
successful. The account provided by Jones also suggests that for the Mongols, with their
superior technology of warfare and their eﬀective terror tactics, θ was much larger than
one. For example, according to Desmond Martin (1971) and Michel Hoang (1990), between
1211 and 1215 an army of little more than 110,000 Mongols defeated an army of 500,000
Chinese and conquered the Chin Empire of Northern China. According to Martin and Leo
de Hartog (1989) in 1223 a Mongol army of 20,000 decisively defeated a Russian army of
80,000 in the Battle of the River Khalka. As Martin writes (pages 11-12),
Whenever it is possible to obtain reliable information on the strength of Mongol
forces, one ￿nds that often they were heavily outnumbered by their enemies. We
shall see that in 1211 Chingis Khan marched against the Chin with little more
than 110,000 men ￿ decidedly less than a quarter of the forces of his opponent.
During 1219 he mobilized perhaps 150,000 eﬀectives for the war against the
Khwarazm Shah. On that occasion, while the army opposed to him was neither
15quite so large ￿ approximately 400,000 ￿ or as well organized as that of the
Chin, he had to march west nearly one thousand miles from his last home base
before reaching the enemy￿s border. . . In the troops of Chingis Khan numerical
inferiority, both on the battle￿eld and on campaign, was common.
Also, there seems to be no reason to presume that, even if it was not larger than one, the
value of k associated with expansion of the Mongol empire typically was much smaller than
one. Thus, abstracting from liquidity constraints, it would seem puzzling that the Mongols
did not mainly use a strategy of Coerced Annexation. But, if for the Mongols g was a
binding constraint, then this puzzle is solved.
Indeed there are other good reasons to think that the Mongols were subject to liquidity
constraints. Most importantly, the Mongols started with a small population relative to
their imperial ambitions. According to Martin and Hoang, the Mongol population at the
beginning of the 13th century was about one million people, whereas by 1260 the Mongol
empire had a population of about 100 million people. In addition, because the Mongols were
originally nomads, they probably did not begin their imperial expansion with large amounts
of accumulated capital or other resources. Also, at the beginning their empire building it
is likely that the diﬃculty of collecting taxes from a nomadic population constrained their
ability to mobilize resources.
Turning to the Ottoman empire, our theory suggests an explanation for the clear diﬀer-
ence in the strategies that the Ottomans used in Anatolia and in the Balkans. The Ottomans
seemed to have used a strategy of Uncoerced Annexation to incorporate Anatolia into their
empire. Metin Kunt (1995, page 10) writes, ￿Ottoman historical tradition describes the in-
corporation of Muslim lands as a peaceful process, in some cases as voluntary submission.￿
In contrast, to incorporate the Balkans into their empire the Ottomans used a combination
of Coerced Annexation, especially in annexing Bosnia in 1453 and Herzegovina in 1454, and
Attempted Conquest in other countries, notably Serbia.
16Kunt suggests that the Ottoman armies were more eﬀective in the Balkans than in
Anatolia because the Black Death aﬀected the Balkans much more than Anatolia. Kunt
writes (page 11),
Consideration should also be given to the eﬀects of the mid-fourteenth century
Black Death on the demography of Anatolia and the Balkan peninsula. In later
Ottoman sources we ￿nd no mention of the plague which devastated so much
of the Mediterranean and Europe, though event-book ￿calendars￿ have scattered
references for various years. Constantinople and other Byzantine territories suf-
fered, as did part of Islamic West Asia such as Syria and Egypt, but not, it seems,
the gazi T¤ urkmen emirates. It may be that the Turkic and Mongolian population
of Anatolia and parts of Iran were relatively immune to the plague strain, which
seems to have had its origin in the great Eurasian steppe, carried by Genoese
ships from Crimea through Constantinople to the Mediterranean and beyond to
northern Europe. If it is true the plague had less of an impact on the O￿ guz of
Anatolia than on the Greeks and other peoples of the Balkans, this would have
been another factor in the swift success of Murad Bey￿s troops in the Balkans.
As our theory suggests, enjoying a larger θ in the Balkans, the Ottomans put aside the
strategy of Uncoerced Annexation that they used in Anatolia.
8. The Theory Applied to Nazi Germany
Turning to modern times, our theory also can help us to understand the strategies that
Nazi Germany used to build its empire. We focus on German territorial ambitions in central
and eastern Europe.11 On our reading of history, the Germans used a strategy of Coerced
11Whether the Nazis had ultimate territorial ambitions elsewhere is not clear. In September 1939 Great
Britain and France, being unwilling to acquiesce in further German aggression in the East, declared war on
Germany. A.J.P. Taylor (1961, page 70) tells us, ￿Against all expectations, Hitler found himself at war with
the Western Powers before he had conquered the East. Nevertheless, Eastern expansion was the primary
17Annexation in taking over Austria and then the Sudetenland and the rest of Czechoslovakia, a
successful strategy of Attempted Conquest of Poland, a strategy of Uncoerced Annexation in
inducing Hungary and Romania to join the Axis alliance, and ￿nally an unsuccessful strategy
of Attempted Conquest of the Soviet Union. Our analysis implies that these diﬀerences in
Nazi strategy resulted either from diﬀerences in θ or in k or from liquidity constraints.
Prior to the German annexation of Austria in March 1938, the existence of a substantial
pro-Nazi faction within Austria undermined the ability of the Austrian leaders to resist
German aggression without the support of Austria￿s ostensible foreign friends. As William
Shirer (1960, page 323) reminds us,
Throughout 1937, the Austrian Nazis, ￿nanced and egged on by Berlin, had
stepped up their campaign of terror. Bombings took place nearly every day in
some part of the country, and in the mountain provinces massive and often violent
Nazi demonstrations weakened the governments position.
But, Great Britain, France, and Italy failed to support Austrian independence and to oppose
the Anschluss.S h i r e r( 1960, page 327), drawing on Schuschnigg￿s book, Austrian Requiem,
and on Schuschnigg￿s Nuremberg aﬃdavit provides the following paraphrasing of Hitler￿s
boasting to then Austrian chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg when they met at Berchtesgaden,
Hitler￿s mountain retreat, in February 1938.
Don￿t think for one moment that anybody on earth is going to thwart my deci-
s i o n s .I t a l y ?Is e ee y et oe y ew i t hM u s s o l i n i ...E n g l a n d ?E n g l a n dw i l ln o tm o v e
one ￿nger for Austria. . . And France? France could have stopped Germany in
the Rhineland and then we would have had to retreat. But now it is too late for
France.
purpose of his policy, if not the only one.￿ But, other historians suggest that the Nazis intended all along
to incorporate western Europe into their empire. See, for example, Gerhard Weinberg (1994, page 107).
18Shirer (page 330) also tells us vividly how Schuschnigg was then forced into signing an
agreement that eﬀectively ended Austria￿s independence ￿under the terrible threat of armed
attack￿. British and French timidity, together with the existence of a substantial pro-Nazi
faction within Austria, meant that in confronting Austria the Germans enjoyed a large value
of θ. Hence, as our theory implies, the Germans used a strategy of Coerced Annexation.
At Munich in September 1938 Great Britain and France, in their eﬀorts to appease Hitler
and avoid war, eﬀectively handed the Sudetenland to Germany. Manfred Messerschmidt
(1990, page 657) summarizes the British and French reluctance to support the Czechs in the
months leading to the Munich pact.
As the British saw, Hitler was in a position to create faits accomplis that could
only be reversed by a long war. At the beginning of such a war, British aid must
be basically con￿ned to economic pressure. Hence, the British government placed
more hopes in an Anglo-French policy of urging Prague to be more conciliatory
to its German minority. In other words, London basically thought that an initial
German success could not be avoided. At the beginning of May [of 1938] Daladier
indicated to Bullit, the American ambassador, what conclusion the French drew
from this: they would not be able to ￿ght a war in defence of Czechoslovakia.
Their attitude was also aﬀected by fear of German air superiority.
According to Shirer (page 417), reporting what a British oﬃcial told two Czech representa-
tives at Munich,
If you do not accept, he admonished them, as he prepared to go, you will have to
settle your aﬀairs with the Germans absolutely alone. Perhaps the French may
tell you this more gently, but you can believe me that they share our views. They
are disinterested.
Again, because of British and French timidity, the Germans enjoyed a high value of θ, and
again, as our analysis implies, the Germans used a strategy of Coerced Annexation.
19Following the annexation of the Sudetenland, and after again threatening the Czechs with
military action, the Germans occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. Once again,
it was clear that Great Britain and France would not intervene in defense of Czechoslovakia.
Shirer (page 450) writes, ￿Neither Great Britain nor France made the slightest move to save
it, though at Munich they had solemnly guaranteed Czechoslovakia against aggression.￿ In
his discussion of the British and French ￿guarantee￿ of Czech independence, Messerschmidt
(page 674) writes,
Chamberlain felt committed to it on moral grounds, but he did not envisage
the commitment leading to a confrontation with Germany. The French view was
much the same. Bonnet and his political friends wanted an accord with Germany.
Halifax considered that they must avoid getting into a position in which Great
Britain and France might be called on to act against Germany and Italy.
Furthermore, after the Munich pact, the rest of Czechoslovakia laid almost defenseless
to the German army. Shirer (pages 421-422) writes
The ￿nal settlement of November 20, 1938, forced Czechoslovakia to cede to
Germany 11,000 square miles of territory in which dwelt 2,800,000 Sudeten Ger-
mans and 800,000 Czechs. Within this area lay all the vast Czech forti￿cations
which hitherto had formed the most formidable defense line in Europe, with the
possible exception of the Maginot Line in France.
When the Germans confronted Czechoslovakia in March 1939, again they had a large value
of θ, and again they used a strategy of Coerced Annexation.
Now we come to Poland. Several factors suggest that, in confronting Poland, the Germans
did not have a value of θ as large as they enjoyed in confronting Austria or Czechoslovakia.
First, the probability of an Allied intervention was higher than in the case of Austria or
Czechoslovakia. After the Anschluss and the annexation of Czechoslovakia, public opinion
20in Great Britain and France was opposed to any further concessions to Germany. The British
and French governments acted accordingly. Shirer (page 454) reports that on March 31st,
1939 Chamberlain said before the Commons:
In the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and
which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their
national forces, His Majesty￿s Government would feel themselves bound at once
to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given
the Polish Government an assurance to this eﬀect. I may add that the French
Government have authorized me to make it plain that they stand in the same
position in this matter.
Second, the Poles were ￿rmer than the Austrians or the Czechs in resisting German
threats. As the Germans pressed claims on the port of Danzig and the Polish corridor,
Shirer (page 464) writes,
Warsaw was not so easily intimidated as Vienna or Prague. The next day, March
28, Beck sent for the German ambassador and told him, in answer to Ribbentrop￿s
declaration that a Polish coup against Danzig would signify a casus belli,t h a t
he in turn was forced to state that any attempt by Germany or the Nazi Danzig
Senate to alter the status of the Free City would be regarded by Poland as a
casus belli.
With θ in the case of Poland not being large enough to warrant a strategy of Coerced An-
nexation, and with k apparently not being large enough to warrant a strategy of Uncoerced
Annexation, the Germans, as our theory predicts, used a strategy of Attempted Conquest.
In contrast to Poland, both Hungary and Romania provide examples of Uncoerced An-
nexation. The distinguishing feature of Hungary and Romania seems to be that k was
large because annexation, which took the form of Hungary and Romania joining the Axis
21alliance under German leadership, oﬀered large military advantages to the Germans. These
advantages were both geopolitical and material. The Germans needed manpower in order
to confront the Soviet Union, and the military forces of both Hungary and Romania would
￿ght, more or less eﬀectively, along side of the Wehrmacht. In addition, the Germans coveted
the Romanian oil ￿elds.12
To induce the Hungarians and Romanians to join the Axis alliance, the Germans used
policies similar to those that the Romans had used in annexing their client states. As a
result of the First World War Hungary had lost territory and population, whereas Romania
had gained territory and population. In the interwar period Hungarian policy focused on
recovering its lost territory and population, whereas Romania was concerned with maintain-
ing its gains. The Germans oﬀered the Hungarians, as well as the Romanians, a share of the
spoils of war. J¤ urgen F¤ orster (1998, pages 412, 416, and 417) tells us,
After the outbreak of the European war Hungarian policy, while maintaining
its independence and avoiding an open rupture with the Western powers, was
aimed at achieving its revisionist objectives through close alignment with the
Axis...[Later] with her Third Army (approximately 146,000 men) Hungary partic-
ipated in the military and political smashing of Yugoslavia...Hungary reacquired
B· acska, the Mur territory, and the Baranya triangle...In consequence, Hungary
had nearly doubled her territory, compared with her 1920 frontiers, both in area
and in population...
The Germans also oﬀered the Romanians security against the territorial claims of the
Soviet Union, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In describing Romanian policy after the Soviet an-
nexation of Bessarabia, Herta, and northern Bukowina in 1940, F¤ orster writes (page 393)
12From a military standpoint there was little diﬀerence between direct German rule, as in the case of
Austria, and joining the Axis alliance under German leadership. Also, when it suited other Nazi objectives,
especially pursuit of their genocidal policies, the Germans imposed direct rule on Hungary and Romania.
22As no help was to be expected from Great Britain, [King] Carol was feverishly
trying to gain German support against the Hungarian and Bulgarian revision-
ist claims...He saw his country￿s only salvation in a very close alignment with
Germany, with which he was willing to co-operate in all ￿elds...On 1 July 1940
Romania renounced the now worthless Anglo-French guarantee of her frontiers
and on 11 July left the League of Nations. Carol, moreover, formed a government
of respected pro-German ministers...
Then, on June 22nd, 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union, launching, with the
active support of their Hungarian and Romanian allies, ￿Operation Barbarossa￿. In con-
fronting the Soviet Union the Germans surely enjoyed a high value of θ. They had amply
demonstrated their military might in easily conquering Poland, France, and the Low Coun-
tries. Undoubtedly, the Wehrmacht was qualitatively superior to the Soviet army in terms
of both weapons and leadership.
But, the Soviet Union had the ability to mobilize massive armed forces. Moreover, the
Nazis were not yet in a position to demand large sacri￿ces for the war eﬀort. Rolf-Dieter
M¤ uller (1998, p. 187-188) writes
Once the euphoria of the early summer of 1940 had evaporated, it became obvious
that Germany, while dominating large parts of the European continent, had not
in fact achieved any abundance of material assets as a result. The performance
of the German war economy was still considerably below the pre-war level...
Germany was unable to draw on any additional manpower reserves. Repeated
demands from military quarters that greater use should be made of female labour
were rejected by the political leadership. Any more intensive exploitation of the
manpower potential was prevented not only by ideological and administrative
obstacles, but also by a lack of enthusiasm for the war among broad circles of
the population.
23The high command of the German army calculated that ￿while the enemy would have
approximately 155 divisions, German strength would be about the same￿. (Shirer, page
822).
Thus, even if θ was large enough to warrant a strategy of Coerced Annexation, liq-
uidity constraints apparently prevented the Germans from using this strategy. Accordingly,
as our theory suggests, the Nazi Empire chose a strategy of Attempted Conquest of the
Soviet Union. From an ex-ante perspective this choice presumably was sound, albeit risky.
Unfortunately for the Germans, a combination of bad luck and unexpected Russian heroism
caused Operation Barbarosa to fail.
9. Summary
This paper has developed an economic theory of empire building. This theory addresses
the choice among three strategies that empire builders historically have used: Uncoerced
Annexation, Coerced Annexation, and Attempted Conquest. Annexation, whether unco-
erced or coerced, is peaceful, whereas Attempted Conquest involves the application of force.
Our theory views these strategies as merely diﬀerent ways to achieve the goal of building
ap r o ￿table empire in the most pro￿table way. In the famous words of the 19th century
military strategist Carl von Clausewitz (1976, page 87), ￿War is merely the continuation of
p o l i c yb yo t h e rm e a n s . ￿
Our theory implies that the key factors in choosing among these strategies are the eco-
nomic gains from imperial expansion, the anticipated relative eﬀectiveness of imperial armies,
the costs of projecting imperial military power, and liquidity constraints on ￿nancing im-
perial armies. The theory also addressed the scope of imperial ambitions. The paper used
historical examples from the Roman, Mongol, Ottoman, and Nazi German empires to illus-
trate the applicability of the theory.
We conjecture that the theory also would help us to understand the strategies used by
other empire builders as well as the scope of their imperial ambitions. Applying the theory
24to the building of overseas empires by European powers from the 16th through the 19th
centuries would seem to be an especially interesting extension, but we leave this exercise for
another paper.
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27Appendix A: Derivation of Condition (9)
RA > 0 obtains only if k>1.
Assuming that Ra equals (k − 1)ω,R A ≥ RC obtains if and only if
either (A) θk<2a n d( k − 1)ω ≥ θk2ω/4
or (B) θk ≥ 2a n d( k − 1)ω ≥ (θk − 1)ω/θ.
Observe that (k − 1)ω ≥ θk2ω/4i s e q u i v a l e n t t oθk ≤ 4(k − 1)/k.





Thus, condition (A) obtains if and only if
either (A.1) k<2a n dθ ≤ 4(k − 1)/k2
or (A.2) 2 ≤ k<2/θ.
Next, observe that (k − 1)ω ≥ (θk − 1)ω/θ is equivalent to θ ≤ 1.
Thus, condition (B) obtains if and only if
(B.1) 1 ≥ θ ≥ 2/k.
Furthermore, either condition (A.2) or condition (B.1) obtains if and only if
(C) k ≥ 2a n dθ ≤ 1.
Thus, RA ≥ RC obtains if and only if either condition (A.1) or condition (C) obtains.
28Appendix B: Derivation of Conditions for 0 <R A ≥ RC with f>0
RA > 0 obtains only if k>1.
Recall that RC ≤ 0 obtains if condition (14) is satis￿ed.
Thus, assuming that condition (14) is satis￿ed, 0 <R A ≥ RC obtains if and only if k>1.
Assuming that condition (14) is not satis￿ed and that Ra equals (k − 1)ω,R A ≥ RC
obtains if and only if
either (A) θk<2a n d( k − 1)ω ≥ θk2ω/4 − f
or (B) θk ≥ 2a n d( k − 1)ω ≥ (θk − 1)ω/θ − f.
Observe that (k − 1)ω ≥ θk2ω/4 − f is equivalent to θk ≤ 4(k − 1 + f/ω)/k.




< 2(1 − f/ω).
Thus, condition (A) obtains if and only if
either (A.1) k<2(1 − f/ω)a n dθ ≤ 4(k − 1 + f/ω)/k2
or (A.2) 2(1 − f/ω) ≤ k<2/θ.
Next, observe that (k − 1)ω ≥ (θk − 1)ω/θ − f is equivalent to θ ≤ 1/(1 − f/ω).
Thus, condition (B) obtains if and only if
(B.1) 1/(1 − f/ω) ≥ θ ≥ 2/k.
Furthermore, either condition (A.2) or condition (B.1) obtains if and only if
(C) k ≥ 2(1 − f/ω)a n dθ ≤ 1/(1 − f/ω).
Thus, assuming that condition (14) is not satis￿ed, RA ≥ RC obtains if and only if
k>1 and either condition (A.1) or condition (C) obtains. Consequently, assuming that
condition (14) is not satis￿ed, the conditions for 0 <R A ≥ RC are satis￿ed if and only if
k>1 and either condition (A.1) or condition (C) obtains.
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